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Abstract 
Economic regulation of urban water service providers is necessary to guard the equity principle and promote 
universal water service coverage that is an overarching target for achievement of Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). This paper reports on research carried out in Lusaka, Zambia, one of seven worldwide case-
studies on how to incorporate the needs of the urban poor, through a universal service obligation, as a 
primary duty of regulation. The study found that NWASCO, the Zambian regulator has made commendable 
progress towards ‘good regulation’ principles of independence, accountability, consistency, transparency, 
proportionality and equitable targeting of interventions. Clearly, there good lessons for policy makers in other 
developing countries to learn from the way regulation structures, systems and procedures were set up in 
Zambia, and how they are functioning at present Recommendations have been made to improve these 
attributes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Background to the Problem 
At the beginning of the millennium, it was estimated that 1.6 billion and 2.2 billion people, the 
majority of whom lived in developing countries, lacked access to safe drinking water and basic 
sanitation, respectively (WHO/UNICEF, 2000). According to the WHO/UNICEF 2000 Joint 
Monitoring Program, 27% and 18% of the population in Africa and Asia respectively live informal 
settlements of the cities. Unlike residents of low-density well planned parts of the cities, these urban 
poor people rarely get full benefits from piped water services as there are hardly any piped water 
networks in the informal settlements. Instead, many consumers in low-income areas rely on 
alternative small-scale service providers, or water vendors, who are a common sight in many 
developing country cities. For various reasons, the prices charged by most vendors are substantially 
inflated compared with the utility tariffs, sometimes with a multiplication factor of as high as 
twenty times (Collignon & Vezina, 2000). Apart from the impact of the doubtful water quality of 
services supplied by water vendors, the urban poor are doubly negatively affected by meagre 
quantities of water they are forced to purchase and use, on the account of the exorbitant prices. 
 
In developed economies, the provision of water as a basic service is one of public service 
obligations. Public service obligations concern those services that are of public interest, which, 
under normal circumstances, may not be availed by the service providers if they were to only 
consider their commercial interests. Certain public services such as drinking water for households 
qualify for universal service obligations, requiring universal rather than specific coverage, as they 
are vital for human survival (Simmonds, 2003). The situation in most low-income countries is 
different.  The formal mechanisms by which networked utilities in low-income countries are 
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normally required to meet the needs of the poor are unclear. Although there is a general awareness 
of the ideal of the public service obligation to achieve public health, it is generally assumed that 
public providers are not required to provide service to ‘illegal’, low-income settlements or peri-
urban areas. If Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for universal water service coverage are to 
be achieved, national governments have a responsibility to ensure that water utilities serve all 
customers, irrespective of social status or income levels. As the state rolls back its frontiers of 
service delivery and takes on a new role of overseer in the new era of market liberalisation and 
privatisation, regulation emerges as a potentially powerful tool to ensure adequate service provision 
to the poor. 
 
Economic regulation is vital, given the fact that provision of water services is a natural public 
monopoly, i.e. initial colossal sums of capital funds usually sunk into infrastructure development, 
coupled with large economies of scale in water service provision creates a situation in which it is 
not attractive to operate a competing network. Incentive-based economic regulation of water and 
sanitation providers has proved to be a powerful tool for improving services particularly but not 
exclusively in the context of public private partnerships in developing countries (Nickson & 
Franceys, 2003). Notable examples of good practices are the Philippines, Indonesia, Argentina, 
Bolivia and Columbia. Although it was initially assumed that international private providers could 
never serve the interest of the urban poor, studies have demonstrated that some international private 
operators have provided differentiated services to low-income settlements, through which the urban 
poor have benefit significantly (Laurie & Crespo, 2002). This development has often happened as a 
result of the skills of the private operator rather than due to any clear leadership of government 
through its agent, the water regulator (Nickson & Franceys, 2003).  
 
Regulators in developing countries have a bigger challenge, where democratic governance systems 
and structures are underdeveloped (Olowu, 2000). The operating environment in developing 
countries present higher risks of regulatory capture, in which  regulatory decisions may be 
politically interfered with, or become more aligned with regulated companies, both of which 
situations could be detrimental to public interest. To strike the right balance between protecting 
individuals’ and companies’ rights, the UK government have endorsed five principles of ‘good 
regulation’: proportionality, accountability, consistency, transparency and targeting of interventions 
(Franceys, 2004). Another crucial factor for regulators in developing countries is independence 
from political interference. There are hardly any studies reported in the literature on systems and 
structures put in place to effectively regulate water service providers in developing countries for the 
benefit of all consumers, particularly the poor. This paper reports on research carried out to reduce 
this knowledge gap.  
 
The Research Project 
A world-wide research was carried out in 2004/05 to investigate existing regulatory systems for 
urban water services in developing countries. The research project entitled ‘Regulating Public and 
Private Partnerships for the Poor’ was sponsored by the British Department of International 
Development, and coordinated by Institute of Water and Environment (IWE), Cranfield University. 
While contributing to the overall goal of raising the welfare of the urban poor, the specific purpose 
of the research project was to add to the current understanding of the required technical, social, 
economic and legal framework that will facilitate water service regulators in developing countries 
to ensure early achievement of the universal service obligation as a service provider’s primary duty. 
Field research was carried out in Ghana, the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, Indonesia, Jordan, the 
Philippines, Uganda and Zambia.  
 
The field research investigated three main aspects: (i) the present mechanisms for requiring 
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achievement of universal service; (ii) provision by the direct provider utility for serving the urban 
poor; and (iii) customer representation in ensuring quality of service delivered. For each case study, 
researchers conducted interviews with the regulator(s), the service provider(s), responsible 
government departments, Non-Governmental Organisations involved in provision of water and 
sanitation services, customer forums or water board associations where they exist, and other 
relevant key stakeholders. This paper presents findings from the Zambia case study. 
 
The water and sanitation sector in Zambia has been undergoing reform since 1993, with the purpose 
of making direct service provision a responsibility of new institutions that are independent of 
government, while leaving the Ministry of Local Government and Housing, the lead ministry to 
play the role of policy development, coordination and facilitation for the urban water and sanitation 
sector. Other key institutions in the urban water sector are the local authorities, who provide water 
services through established commercial utilities, municipal water/sanitation departments or works 
departments. As part of the reform process, the National Water and Sanitation Council (NWASCO) 
was established by the Water and Sanitation Act, 1997, and charged with the responsibility of 
regulating service providers in the urban water and sanitation sector.  
 
Lusaka, the country’s capital city had a population of  about 1.1 million people at the end of  2000, 
of which 60% lived in low-income settlements (The Government of Zambia, 2003). Officially, 
provision of water and sanitation services in Lusaka City is the responsibility of Lusaka Water and 
Sewerage Company (LWSC), a private liability company that is wholly owned by Lusaka City 
Council. At the time of the fieldwork, the non-revenue water in LWSC’s operational area was 
estimated at 58% of total production, and the utility’s service coverage was 34% of the total 
population in Lusaka (NWASCO, 2003). Invariably, people living in low-income settlements, 
locally known as peri-urban areas or compounds, are the ones most affected by the utility’s poor 
service levels.  
 
Many residents of peri-urban areas a lot of time collecting water usually from shallow wells, which 
is often of poor bacteriological and physical-chemical quality, resulting into high incidence of 
water-borne diseases. The Government of Zambia developed the National Peri-urban Water and 
Sanitation Strategy in 2001 to improve services to the low-income settlements. In line with this 
national strategy, LWSC set up a peri-urban unit way back in 1995 to cater for the provision of 
services to 15 of Lusaka’s compounds, with an estimated total population of 540,000 people at the 
time of the fieldwork. The management model utilised by the peri-urban unit is tailored along 
community participation and/or franchising the day-to-day operations to local entrepreneurs duly 
approved by the community leadership.  
 
METHODS 
The specific research questions answered by the Zambia case study were: 
a. What is the institutional setup of the Regulator? Does the institutional setup foster the 
regulator’s independence, legitimacy, accountability, consistency and transparency? 
b. What is the Regulator in Zambia doing to regulate the Service Provider to deliver universal 
service, particularly to the urban poor?  
c. What mechanisms are in place to ensure participation of the consumers in the regulatory 
mechanism?  
d. Given the huge service gap caused by water utility’s inadequate capacity to fulfil its 
mandate in Lusaka, how effective is the regulator in ensuring that alternative service 
providers deliver adequate levels of service to the large section of the population they serve?  
 
The methodology comprised of (i) review of policy and other organisational documents from 
 4 
government, NWASCO (the regulator) and LWSC (the service provider); (ii) interviews with 
sixteen key informants from government, NWASCO, LWSC, civil society, community leaders, 
international development agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations; and (iii) focus group 
discussions held with selected men and women in a sample of four purposefully selected locations 
of peri-urban areas with an estimated total population of 142,000 people. A total of 34 men and 19 
men participated in five focus group discussions. Interviews, which lasted between one to 1½ hours, 
were held in the offices of the key informants, and covered various topics depending on the 
interviewee’s roles/functions and level of involvement. A generic interview guide was compiled to 
fulfil the research objectives. Participants for the focus group discussions were selected with 
guidance from Resident Development Committees (RDCs), the local community leadership, and 
aimed at balancing the gender, social and economic aspects of the communities.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The Institutional and Organisational Setup of NWASCO 
The National Water and Sanitation Council (NWASCO), which evolved from the Water Sector 
Reform Support Unit, actively took on the roles and functions of an independent regulator in 
October 2000. According to the Water and Sanitation Act 1997, NWASCO’s major functions are to 
(i) advise the government on water and sanitation matters; (ii) advise local authorities on 
commercially viable institutional arrangements for provision of water and sanitation services; (iii) 
license service providers; (iv) develop guidelines for technical and financial management of 
utilities, set up and review tariffs; advise service providers on customer relations management; and 
(v) disseminate water/sanitation services related information to consumers. The legal framework for 
NWASCO is further strengthened by a series of statutory instruments that are continuously being 
appended to the Water and Sanitation Act, 1997. 
 
The policy-making body of the regulator is the NWASCO Council, comprised of 16 members 
appointed by the Minister of Energy and Water Development to represent relevant government 
departments, civil society organisations and the public. The management functions of NWASCO 
are carried out by a Director assisted by other permanent members of staff. The Council appoints 
the Director, Deputy Director and Secretary to Council, who in turn appoint lower cadres of staff. 
Although NWASCO Council members are appointed by the Minister of Energy and Water 
Development, they are responsible to the National Parliament, minimising government interference. 
The operations of NWASCO are mainly funded by (i) one-off application fees paid by all service 
providers at the time of application and licence renewal; (ii) monthly license fees paid by all service 
providers; (iii) international technical assistance; and (iv) government subvention to plug the budget 
deficit. NWASCO’s financial independence from Government has been improving steadily. For 
example, NWASCO’s financial self-reliance improved from 43% in 2001 to70% in 2003 
(NWASCO, 2004). 
 
Regulatory instruments, structures and procedures  
NWASCO has developed and issued guidelines to service providers on various topics such as 
licensing requirements, minimum service levels, business planning, financial projections, 
investment planning, tariff development and adjustment, corporate governance of commercial 
utilities, annual organisational reporting, water supply for low-income urban areas, water quality 
management and human resources management strategy. At the time of the fieldwork, NWASCO 
had set benchmarks for minimum service levels for 11 service indicators. The main service 
indicators include coverage of service area, drinking water quality, service hours, billing frequency, 
response time to complaints, interruption of water supply and blockage of sewers, water pressure in 
the pipe network, sewer flooding, and quality of effluent from sewage treatment plants. When a 
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license has been issued, the service provider is obliged to sign a service level agreement in which it 
is bound to provide services with specified minimum standards. Service standards for each provider 
are arrived at through a negotiation process with the regulator, and depend on the baseline service 
levels at the time of application for a license. Service standards are adjusted periodically through a 
series of three-yearly service level agreements.  
 
NWASCO utilises an audit-based regulation approach in which the primary burden of proof is 
placed on the service provider to demonstrate compliance to standards. Service Agreements 
stipulate that certain minimum information is provided to the regulator on a regular basis. Service 
providers are therefore required to keep registers on key aspects of technical and functional quality 
attributes. The service provider is obliged to provide annual progress reports on service levels 
achieved, compared with the service level agreements, and the proposed action plan for reaching the 
service levels defined in the guidelines. This data is captured into the regulator’s central database, 
checked for accuracy and authenticity, analysed and utilised to compile the annual urban water 
sector reports. Incentives given to the service provider for good performance include positive 
considerations during tariff reviews; and in the allocation of performance-based subsidies; as well 
as better corporate image portrayed in the widely publicised annual performance benchmarks. 
Penalties range from financial fees, suspension of a service provider, to cancellation of a license.  
 
During the fieldwork, a cross-section of key government officials, professional organisations and 
the donor community were interviewed, who highly commended the progress NWASCO had so far 
made in building the foundation for effective regulatory rules, structures and systems. However, 
many participants of the focus group discussions held in the peri-urban areas did not know the 
existence of the regulator. A few focus group participants had learnt about NWASCO through news 
clips in the newspapers and electronic media. None of the focus group participants had seen the 
urban water sector performance reports. 
 
Poverty-aware investment funds 
The Water Supply and Sanitation Act (Act No 28 of 1997) provides for the setting up of a 
Devolution Trust Fund (DTF), investment funds set aside to assist utilities to extend water and 
sanitation services to peri-urban areas. At the time of the fieldwork, the Manager of the DTF was 
reporting to the Director of NWASCO, although discussion were ongoing at the time to make DTF 
more autonomous from the regulator. DTF started its operations in August 2003, and it had so far  
provided funds for (i) rehabilitation and extension of networks in peri-urban areas; (ii) construction 
of kiosks; software/social aspects such as community sensitisation; and (iv) organisational 
development of peri-urban units.  
 
The service providers would access DTF capital on condition that they demonstrated, through a set 
of criteria, that the funds would be used to extend services to low-income communities in a manner 
that would foster community participation and promote cost recovery from the users. The funds 
would be disbursed in instalments, upon satisfactory accountability of previous disbursements, to a 
dedicated bank account. NWASCO  would monitor the progress of the project through monthly 
progress reports submitted by the utility, inspections/site visits, and examination of the utility’s 
expenditure against the physical progress. At the time of fieldwork, the Government of Zambia had 
commissioned a study to evaluate the operations of the DTF and make recommendations for 
improving the criteria for allocation of the investment funds out of DTF. 
 
The customer’s voice into the regulatory mechanism 
NWASCO facilitated the formation of Lusaka Water Watch Group (LWWG) in 2001, and similar 
groups in other cities of Zambia, whose prime purpose was to increase customer involvement and 
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formalise the collective customers’ contribution to the regulatory process, hence enhancing 
‘customer power’. Membership of LWWG was voluntary, but openly competitive, usually 
advertised in the national press. The members, who were selected on the basis that they were 
knowledgeable and motivated by the interest of working in the water sector, were required to serve 
for a two-year term. The major objectives of LWWG were (i) to improvement communication 
between consumer and providers, and ensure customer complaints are adequately handled by the 
service providers; and (ii) to bring the functions of the regulator closer to the consumers and ensure 
a more formal consumer feedback to NWASCO.  
 
NWASCO provided LWWG members with stationary, transport and other logistics to carry out the 
activities. The Public Relation Officer for NWASCO was the liaison officer between LWWG and 
the regulator. Members of LWWG were provided with training to enhance their interpersonal skills.  
To improve their effectiveness LWWG members adopted diversified channels of communication to 
include use of letters, telephone contacts and consumer general meetings (usually organised during 
market days), which resulted into an increased number of registered complaints. The LWWG 
members used civic members in the informal settlements as entry points to community members. 
The LWWG members first discussed with Resident Development Committee members (who are 
elected civic leaders in informal settlements) and/or market management committees prior to 
holding consumer meetings. Venues for consumer meetings were prioritised according to the 
number of complaints received from an area. 
 
LWWG members had made a tremendous contribution to effectiveness of the consumers’ voice 
during the short time they had been in operation. Meetings were scheduled in different informal 
settlements to sensitise the residents on their responsibilities and what minimum service level was 
expected from LWSC, the service provider. In these meetings representatives of the service 
provider participated fully, and were tasked to explain their action plans to improve service levels. 
Through the intervention of LWWG, a number of outstanding complaints were resolved during the 
meetings or thereafter. Furthermore, initial evaluation showed that consumers were increasingly 
receiving a better response to their complaints.  
 
There were a few challenges facing members of LWWG. The level of funding received from 
NWASCO was inadequate compared to the workload, to the extent that the consumer group was 
unknown to most people that participated in focus groups held in the low-income settlements of 
Lusaka. Only acouple of focus group participants had attended a sensitisation meeting addressed by 
LWWG on a market day in one location. Furthermore, there was also a question of sustainability of 
the water watch groups, given that the members were not paid salaries. For instance, at the time of 
the fieldwork, three places out of the designated membership of seven people were vacant, as those 
volunteers had ‘moved on’ to more benefiting occupations.  
 
Alternative service providers 
The Water Works Act (1997) stipulates that LWSC is the designated service provider in the 
geographical area covered by the boundaries of Lusaka City Council. However, as noted earlier on, 
owing to inadequate capacity of LWSC, it was estimated that only 34% of residents of Lusaka City 
Council are adequately served with water services in the fiscal year 2001/2002 (NWASCO, 2003). 
In response to these poor service levels, a number of international development agencies such as 
Japanese International Development Agency (JICA), Ireland Aid and Care International have since 
the early 1990s supported community-based organisations to develop alternative water supply 
systems (mainly using boreholes) and reticulate it to locations in the peri-urban areas, independent 
of LWSC and other recognised service providers. A typical example is Care International that 
supports community-managed water trusts which provide water services to 13 peri-urban areas in 
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Zambia with a total population of about 600,000 people (Kayaga and Mwanamwambwa, 2006). 
 
In spite of the high market share served by independent alternative service providers, they were not 
directly regulated by NWASCO at the time of the fieldwork. The regulator’s official position was 
that NGO-supported independent alternative service providers are only a stop-gap measure, and are 
not a viable and sustainable way of providing services to peri-urban area. According to the 
regulator, all areas under the geographical jurisdiction of a licensed service provider are its 
responsibility, which is fully held accountable for the level of services delivered to consumers in its 
designated service areas. Yet, the water utility has no capacity to supervise or to ensure quality 
assurance in the areas served by the independent alternative service providers. Subsequently, the 
communities served by such independent alternative providers are excluded from the benefits 
accruing from the regulatory regime.  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Government of Zambia, through the enactment of the Water Supply and Sanitation Act No 28 
of 1997 and its associated statutory instruments provided a good legal framework for development 
of an effective regulatory regime. The establishment of an independent National Water Supply and 
Sanitation Council (NWASCO) and management structures paved way for creation of valid 
regulatory administration, rules and structures. The findings of this research show that in the short 
time the regulator has been operational he has depicted remarkable progress in working towards 
achievement of ‘good attributes’ of regulation. The operating environment is conducive for the 
regulator to make independent decisions, with minimal interference from the state. The 
independence will be further enhanced as NWASCO becomes more financially independent.  
 
With increased functionality, the regulator is continuously building legitimacy among key 
stakeholders, as could be evidenced by the high regard accorded by key government officials, 
professional organisations and the donor community in Zambia. To enhance this legitimacy, the 
regulator needs to make a strong partnership with the consumers. Adequate information about the 
regulatory systems should be disseminated to the consumers, particularly those living in low-
income settlements, who are necessarily the biggest beneficiaries of regulation. The information 
should be in a form that is simple, understandable and accessible to the target audience. This 
process will empower the consumers and make them active partners in the regulation process.  
 
Structures and systems have been put in place to make the regulator accountable to the state and 
other stakeholders. However, there is still room to improve accountability to the consumers. For 
instance, it is important that the influence of the regulator is extended to areas served by 
independent alternative service providers, who provide water services to over 50% of Lusaka’s 
population. Such actions will not only promote the principle of accountability to the consumers, but 
also enhance proportionality of benefits to the urban poor. Furthermore, the rights and obligations 
of the consumers, the major stakeholders in the water sector, and the major beneficiaries of the 
regulatory regime should be made more explicit through various avenues, such as increased 
emphasis in the Water Act and service delivery guidelines.  
 
The setting up of the Devolution Trust Fund, a fund that is meant to redress the imbalances of 
service levels in the peri-urban area, was a step in the right direction. It is important that its 
management is carefully worked out to ensure that the subsidies are not high-jacked, but are well 
targeted to benefit the most vulnerable members of society. The optimal solution is to enhance 
participation of representatives of consumers in the decision-making process of the Fund. To this 
end, the creation of the Lusaka Water Watch Group (LWWG), though still on a learning curve, was 
a good development. LWWG has already paved way for the customer voice to feed into the 
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regulatory process, and created benefits for the consumers through the reduction of the service 
provider’s response time to consumer complaints. Collaboration between Water Watch Groups and 
the elected community leaders should be improved, as a way of scaling up the activities of the 
Water Watch Groups in the peri-urban areas in a cost effective manner. Clearly, there good lessons 
for policy makers in other developing countries to learn from the way regulation structures, systems 
and procedures were set up in Zambia, and how they are functioning at present. 
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